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Abstract
Influenza pandemics disproportionately impact remote and/or isolated Indigenous communities worldwide.
The differential risk experienced by such communities warrants the recommendation of specific mitigation
measures. Interviewer-administered questionnaires were conducted with adult key health care informants
from three remote and isolated Canadian First Nations communities of sub-Arctic Ontario. Forty-eight
mitigation measures (including the setting, pandemic period, trigger, and duration) were questioned.
Participants’ responses were summarized and collected data were deductively and inductively coded. The
participants recommended 41 of the questioned mitigation measures, and often differed from previous
literature and national recommendations. Results revealed that barriers, such as overcrowded housing, limited
supplies, and health care infrastructure, impacted the feasibility of implementing mitigation measures. These
findings suggest that pandemic plans should recommend control strategies for remote and isolated Canadian
First Nations communities that may not be supported in other communities. These findings highlight the
importance of engaging locally impacted populations using participatory approaches in policy decision-
making processes. Other countries with remote and/or isolated Indigenous communities are encouraged to
include recommendations for mitigation measures that specifically address the unique needs of such
communities in an effort to improve their health outcomes during the next influenza pandemic.
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Recommended Mitigation Measures for an Influenza Pandemic in Remote and 
Isolated First Nations Communities of Ontario, Canada: A Community-Based 
Participatory Research Approach 
Since another global influenza pandemic is inevitable (Osterholm, 2005), the World Health 
Organization (WHO) recommends that nations have effective pandemic plans in place to minimize the 
associated social and economic consequences (World Health Organization, 2009). In Canada, the 
Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan for the Health Sector (CPIP) provides guidance for a consistent and 
comprehensive pandemic response and recommends various mitigation measures, both pharmaceutical 
and non-pharmaceutical, to reduce the impact of an influenza pandemic (Public Health Agency of 
Canada, 2006). As the CPIP is national in scope and regional diversities regarding healthcare delivery 
exist, it recommends that jurisdictional plans address specific operational details associated with 
implementing an influenza pandemic response (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006). 
Having specific details regarding the implementation of effective mitigation measures is particularly 
important for marginalized populations, such as Aboriginal (First Nations, Inuit, and Métis) populations 
in Canada living in geographically remote and isolated areas. Although the 2009 H1N1 pandemic 
(A(H1N1)pdm09) was mild compared to previous pandemics (Gatherer, 2009; Reed et al., 2009; Shen, 
Ma, & Wang, 2009), Indigenous populations residing in remote and/or isolated areas suffered 
disproportionately, particularly in Canada, the United States, and Australia (Barker, 2010; Flint et al., 
2010; Kermode-Scott, 2009; Kumar et al., 2009; La Ruche et al., 2009; Spence & White, 2010; Trauer, 
Laurie, McDonnell, Kelso, & Markey, 2011; Zarychanski et al., 2010). The differential health outcomes 
experienced in such communities during a pandemic may be attributed to a variety of complex 
challenges that arise from social, economic, environmental, and cultural inequalities (Groom et al., 
2009; Richardson, Driedger, Pizzi, Wu, & Moghadas, 2012; Tsuji, 1998). Previous research suggests 
that differences in the presence of pre-existing co-morbidities, population profiles, access to healthcare 
services, transmission dynamics, and malnutrition in remote and/or isolated Indigenous communities 
may result in more severe influenza-related outcomes (La Ruche et al., 2009; Morrison, Buckeridge, 
Xiao, & Moghadas, 2014; Mostaço-Guidolin, Towers, Buckeridge, & Moghadas, 2013; Spence & White, 
2010). Thus, the differential risk experienced by remote and/or isolated Indigenous communities 
warrants the recommendation of mitigation measures that are context-specific and community-
informed to better prepare them for the next public health emergency (Lee, Rogers, & Braunack-Mayer, 
2008; Richardson et al., 2012; Uscher-Pines, Duggan, Garoon, Karron, & Faden, 2007). 
Scientific evidence regarding effective community measures to mitigate the ensuing effects of an 
influenza pandemic is limited (Aledort, Lurie, Wasserman, & Bozzette, 2007; Oshitani, 2006). Although 
important evidence and lessons learnt pertaining to the use of various mitigation measures emerged after 
the A(H1N1)pmd09 experience, gaps in knowledge remain (Cowling et al., 2010; Aburto et al., 2010; 
Halder, Kelso, & Milne, 2010). For instance, there remains a lack of data regarding the knowledge, 
attitudes, and practices of mitigation measures for pandemic influenza across diverse populations, 
especially those that are marginalized (Aiello et al., 2010). Recommendations for implementing 
mitigation measures are inherently complex as it varies according to the pandemic period, setting, 
availability of resources, severity of the pandemic, and requires reflection on societal values (Aledort et 
al., 2007; Thompson, Faith, Gibson, & Upshur, 2006). Since marginalized populations best understand 
how their community perspectives and values impact their ability to comply and implement public 
1
Charania and Tsuji: Pandemic Mitigation Measures for Remote Indigenous Communities
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2014	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
health recommendations, directly engaging locally impacted populations can provide valuable insights 
to guide recommendations for specific mitigation measures (Braunack-Mayer et al., 2010; Groom et al., 
2009; Uscher-Pines et al., 2007). Prior to the next pandemic, governments and relevant institutions are 
recommended to identify populations that have been historically marginalized and engage these 
populations in the planning process to facilitate the inclusion of ways to address their specific needs 
during a pandemic outbreak (Uscher-Pines et al., 2007). 
Given this, the purpose of the presented study is to elicit a list of recommended mitigation measures 
(including the setting, pandemic period, trigger, and duration) specific for remote and isolated First 
Nations communities in Canada, using a community-based participatory research approach. These 
specific recommendations will subsequently be compared and contrasted to current national 
recommendations and relevant literature. This study also aims to highlight the importance and value of 
using participatory methods to engage locally impacted populations in health policy decision-making 
processes.  
Methods 
Community-Based Participatory Research Approach  
The present study employed a community-based participatory research (CBPR) approach, as 
participatory research approaches have been successful in influencing policy and practice (Horowitz, 
Robinson, & Seifer, 2009; O’Brien & Whitaker, 2011; Themba-Nixon, Minkler, & Freudenberg, 2008). 
The hallmark principles of CBPR, such as equitable partnerships, valuing different ways of knowing, and 
addressing issues of local importance, can foster the engagement of Indigenous populations in 
influencing health policy (Fletcher, 2003; LaVeaux & Christopher, 2009). As such, this project arose 
from a longstanding partnership between the co-author’s (LJST) research team and the involved 
communities, and addressed a locally relevant issue (Horowitz et al., 2009; O’Brien & Whitaker, 2011). 
The study stemmed from previous research that involved modifying the community-level pandemic 
plans of the study communities by engaging various community stakeholders (e.g., Band Councils 
[locally-elected First Nations government], health care staff, clergy, education boards, etc.) (Charania & 
Tsuji, 2012). Since CBPR endeavours also emphasize shared control of decision-making, a community-
based advisory group was formed of three community representatives (one from each study 
community) to aid in various aspects of this study including designing the study, piloting the questions, 
informing the data analysis process, and disseminating the results (Charania & Tsuji, 2011; Kirby, 
Lévesque, Wabano, & Robertson-Wilson, 2007). Achieving action-oriented outcomes that benefit the 
involved communities is an important aspect of CBPR (Israel, Eng, Schulz, & Parker, 2005; Israel et al., 
2008) so the communities requested that the results of this study be used to further update the 
community infection control measures section in each of the community’s influenza pandemic plan 
(Charania & Tsuji, 2012). Ethics approval to conduct this study was granted by the Office of Research 
Ethics at the University of Waterloo, and was supported by the Band Councils of the involved 
communities. 
Study Area and Population  
Three communities (names omitted for anonymity purposes) were included in the present study and 
are located in northern Ontario, Canada. All are characterized as being remote (i.e., the nearest service 
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center with year-round road access is located over 350 kilometers away) and isolated (i.e., the 
communities are only accessible by airplanes year-round) First Nations communities (Public Health 
Agency of Canada, 2006). Nine adult-key health-care informants were purposively selected (three from 
each community) based on the inclusion criteria of having experience as a practicing health care 
professional (e.g., health director, nurse-in-charge, clinical coordinator, etc.) in a remote and isolated 
First Nations community and being directly involved in their respective community’s health sector 
response to A(H1N1)pdm09; thus, they had the required experience and authority to comment. 
Furthermore, as multiple government organizations are responsible for Aboriginal health in Canada 
(e.g., federal, provincial, and First Nations) (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006), participants were 
chosen within each of the three communities to ensure that each applicable government body was 
represented. All of the participants invited subsequently agreed and consented to participate in the 
study.  
Data Collection  
An extensive review was conducted of relevant literature and existing (international, national, provincial, 
regional, and community level) pandemic plans to create a comprehensive list of currently discussed 
mitigation measures. Forty-eight mitigation measures (accounting for variations of 41 mitigation 
measures) were included in the interview questionnaire. The questionnaires were administered by the 
lead author (NAC) from July 2010 to October 2011 at a place and time chosen by the participants after 
obtaining informed verbal consent, which is culturally appropriate for the region (Kirby et al., 2007; 
Skinner, Hanning, & Tsuji, 2006). To gain additional insights regarding the data analysis and 
dissemination process, the community-based advisory group was consulted in person by the lead author 
(NAC) in June 2013.  
The interview questionnaire employed a combination of closed- and open-ended questions; thereby 
allowing for comparability amongst participants’ answers in addition to providing the opportunity for 
participants to expand on their opinions (Bryman, 2001). For each mitigation measure, the key 
informants were asked if they would recommend the measure in their community during a future 
influenza pandemic. If a mitigation measure was recommended, the participant was subsequently asked 
to elaborate on the setting, pandemic period, trigger (to begin implementation), and duration (of 
implementation) of the mitigation measure. Definitions of the mitigation measures and aforementioned 
terms were provided to the participant. The interviews ranged in duration from 2 to 4 hours long, were 
conducted in English (as requested by the participant) and audio recorded (with the participant’s 
permission).  
Data Analyses  
The collected data were manually transcribed verbatim into electronic format to allow for deductive 
coding and inductive coding (to reveal any additional insights) using QSR NVivo® computer software 
(version 9.0). The data were deductively analyzed using a template organizing approach in which the 
interview questionnaire was used as a coding template (Bryman, 2001; Crabtree & Miller, 1999).   
The closed-ended questions regarding setting and pandemic period were coded according to pre-
established options, based on previous literature. The participants chose any option that applied for the 
setting (i.e., hospital, ambulatory/community-based healthcare facility, community, and home) 
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(Aledort et al., 2007) and pandemic period (i.e., interpandemic, pandemic alert, and pandemic) (Public 
Health Agency of Canada, 2006). The CPIP outlines the WHO pandemic alert system, which consisted 
of six pandemic phases categorized into three pandemic periods. The interpandemic period (phases 1 
and 2) was characterized by outbreaks in animals caused by a novel influenza subtype that has not yet 
been detected in humans. The pandemic alert period (phases 3, 4, and 5) was characterized by a novel 
influenza subtype causing outbreaks in humans. And the pandemic period (phase 6) was characterized 
by increased and sustained human-to-human transmission of the novel influenza subtype in the general 
population.  
The open-ended questions regarding the trigger and duration of the mitigation measure were 
categorized and coded to allow for comparability amongst participants’ responses. The categories for the 
implementation trigger were outbreak in the zone, outbreak in the community, all the time, and other. 
Herein, zone will refer to the geographic zones in Ontario within which health services are provided by 
the First Nations and Inuit Health Branch of Health Canada (Health Canada, 2011). Implementation 
duration categories were post-outbreak in the zone, post-outbreak in the community, two weeks post-
vaccination of community members (the time required to induce protective antibody titres) (Cox, 
Brokstad, & Ogra, 2004), post-pandemic, all the time, and other. 
Participants’ responses were summarized and the answer most commonly chosen is reported. When 
there was disagreement amongst participants’ responses, the community-based advisory group was 
consulted to decide whether the measure would or would not be recommended.  
Results 
The participants stated that they would recommend 41 of the questioned mitigation measures to be 
implemented in their communities during the next influenza pandemic. The collected data are 
summarized as a list of mitigation measures recommended for use (including the most commonly 
answered setting, pandemic period, trigger, and duration of implementation) (see Table 1) and not 
recommended for use (including participants’ rationale for not supporting the measure) (see Table 2). 
As the level of agreement regarding the recommendation of measures sometimes varied, the most 
pertinent results (as suggested by the community-based advisory group) are highlighted below and 
supplemented by participants’ quotes (Knafl & Howard, 1984). 
The majority of participants deemed one measure, animal-human interchange as not applicable in their 
communities because domestic animal farming does not occur. However, a participant was concerned 
that avian influenza could be transmitted to humans while hunting and harvesting potentially infected 
wild geese. One participant suggested traditional medicine as an additional mitigation measure that 
would be beneficial and culturally-appropriate. The participant recommended that traditional medicine 
practices should be implemented in the community and community members’ homes all of the time, but 
particularly during the alert period. 
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Table 1.List of Recommended Measures to Mitigate an Influenza Pandemic in 
Remote and Isolated First Nations Communities Suggested by Participants (n=9) 
  Mitigation Measure   Setting   Period    Trigger   Duration  
T
r
a
v
e
l
 
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
Entry screening of 
travelers (8
a,1
b) 
Community (8
a,0
b)   Alert (7
a,1
b)  Other (5
a,3
b)   Post-zone outbreak 
(4
a,4
b); Post vaccine 
(4
a,4
b)  
Exit screening of 
travelers (5
a,4
b) 
Community (5
a,0
b)  Alert (5
a,0
b)  Zone outbreak 
(2
a,3
b); Other 
(2
a,3
b) 
Post vaccine (4
a,1
b) 
Travel restrictions on all 
arriving passengers 
(6
a,3
b) 
Community 
(5
a,0
b,1
e) 
Alert 
(5
a,0
b,1
e) 
Other (5
a,1
b)  Post vaccine 
(3
a,2
b,1
e) 
Travel advisories on all 
arriving passengers 
(8
a,1
b) 
Community (8
a,0
b)  Alert (7
a,1
b)  Other (5
a,3
b)  Post-community 
outbreak (3
a,5
b) 
Travel advisories on all 
departing passengers 
(9
a,0
b) 
Community 
(8
a,0
b,1
e) 
Alert 
(6
a,1
b,2
e) 
Zone outbreak 
(4
a,4
b,1
e) 
Other (3
a,5
b,1
e) 
Closing down all borders 
(7
a,2
b) 
Community (7
a,0
b)  Alert (6
a,1
b)  Zone outbreak 
(4
a,3
b) 
Post vaccine 
(4
a,2
b,1
e) 
Quarantine of a 
geographic area (cordon 
sanitaire) (7
a,2
b) 
Community (7
a,0
b)  Alert (5
a,2
b)  Other (4
a,3
b)  Post-zone outbreak 
(3
a,3
b,1
e) 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
i
n
g
 
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
Avoid visiting (9
a,0
b)  Community 
(9
a,0
b);  
Home (9
a,0
b) 
Alert (7
a,2
b)  Zone outbreak 
(7
a,2
b) 
Post-community 
outbreak (4
a,5
b); 
Post vaccine (4
a,5
b) 
Avoid crowding (8
a,1
b)  Hospital (8
a,0
b); 
Ambulatory 
(8
a,0
b);  
Community(8
a,0
b); 
Home (8
a,0
b) 
Alert (8
a,0
b)  Zone outbreak 
(7
a,1
b) 
Post vaccine (5
a,3
b) 
Social distancing 
measures (9
a,0
b) 
Community(9
a,0
b)  Alert (7
a,2
b)  Zone outbreak 
(5
a,4
b) 
Post-community 
outbreak (4
a,5
b); 
Post vaccine (4
a,5
b) 
Voluntary sheltering 
(9
a,0
b) 
Home (7
a,2
b)  Alert (6
a,3
b)  Zone outbreak 
(4
a,5
b) 
Post vaccine (5
a,4
b) 
School closures (9
a,0
b)  Community (9
a,0
b)  Alert (5
a,4
b)  Community 
outbreak(8
a,1
b) 
Post vaccine (8
a,1
b) 
(continued) 
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  Mitigation Measure   Setting   Period  Trigger   Duration  
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
i
n
g
 
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
 
Childcare center closures 
(6
a,0
b,3
d) 
Community 
(6
a,0
b) 
Alert (4
a,2
b)  Community 
outbreak 
(5
a,1
b) 
Post vaccine (6
a,0
b) 
Workplace closures 
(4
a,4
b,1
c) 
Community(4
a,0
b)  Pandemic 
(3
a,1
b) 
Community 
outbreak 
(4
a,0
b) 
Post-community 
outbreak (3
a,1
b) 
Mandatory isolation of ill 
individuals (7
a,2
b) 
Home (6
a,1
b)  Alert (5
a,2
b)  Community 
outbreak 
(3
a,4
b) 
Post-zone outbreak 
(2
a,5
b); Other (2
a,5
b) 
Voluntary isolation of ill 
individuals (6
a,3
b) 
Home (6
a,0
b)  Alert (4
a,2
b)  Zone outbreak 
(3
a,3
b) 
Post-zone outbreak 
(2
a,4
b); Post-
community outbreak 
(2
a,4
b) 
Mandatory quarantine of 
case contacts (5
a,4
b) 
Home (5
a,0
b)  Alert (4
a,1
b)  Community 
outbreak 
(3
a,2
b) 
Other (3
a,2
b) 
Voluntary quarantine of 
case contacts (6
a,3
b) 
Home (6
a,0
b)  Alert (5
a,1
b)  Community 
outbreak 
(5
a,1
b) 
Other (5
a,1
b) 
Restricting attendance at 
public gatherings 
(6
a,2
b,1
e) 
Community(6
a,0
b)  Alert (3
a,3
b); 
Pandemic 
(3
a,3
b) 
Zone outbreak 
(3
a,3
b); 
Community 
outbreak 
(3
a,3
b) 
Post-community 
outbreak (3
a,3
b) 
Cancelling public 
gatherings (9
a,0
b) 
Community(9
a,0
b)  Alert (5
a,4
b)  Zone outbreak 
(5
a,4
b) 
Post vaccine (4
a,5
b) 
S
u
r
v
e
i
l
l
a
n
c
e
 
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
Monitoring trends of 
influenza-like illness 
(9
a,0
b) 
Ambulatory 
(9
a,0
b) 
Alert (7
a,2
b)  All the time 
(3
a,6
b); Other 
(3
a,6
b) 
All the time 
(3
a,5
b,1
e); Post 
pandemic (3
a,5
b,1
e) 
Human surveillance and 
case reporting (9
a,0
b) 
Hospital (8
a,1
b) 
 
Alert (8
a,1
b)  All the time 
(4
a,5
b); Other 
(4
a,5
b) 
Post-community 
outbreak (3
a,6
b); All 
the time (3
a,6
b) 
Contact tracing (6
a,3
b)  Ambulatory 
(5
a,1
b) 
Pandemic 
(4
a,2
b) 
Community 
outbreak 
(6
a,0
b) 
Other (4
a,2
b) 
Home support program 
(7
a,1
b,1
c) 
Ambulatory 
(7
a,0
b) 
Alert (5
a,2
b)  Community 
outbreak 
(6
a,1
b) 
Post-community 
outbreak (3
a,4
b) 
Urge entire population in 
an affected area to check 
for fever at least once 
daily (5
a,3
b,1
c) 
Home (5
a,0
b)  Alert (3
a,2
b); 
Pandemic 
(3
a,2
b) 
Community 
outbreak 
(3
a,2
b) 
Post pandemic 
(2
a,3
b) 
(continued) 
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  Mitigation 
Measure  
Setting   Period  Trigger   Duration  
S
u
r
v
e
i
l
l
a
n
c
e
 
(
c
o
n
t
.
)
 
Rapid influenza 
diagnostic tests  
(8
a,1
b) 
Hospital (8
a,0
b) 
 
Alert (7
a,1
b)  All the time 
(5
a,3
b) 
All the time (4
a,4
b) 
Screening for 
influenza-like illness  
at public places (8
a,1
b) 
Hospital (8
a,0
b); 
Ambulatory 
(8
a,0
b);  
Community 
(8
a,0
b) 
Alert (7
a,1
b)  Zone outbreak 
(4
a,4
b) 
Post vaccine (4
a,4
b) 
I
n
f
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
Modifying cultural 
practices at church and 
funerals (9
a,0
b) 
Community(9
a,0
b)  Alert (8
a,1
b)  Zone outbreak 
(4
a,5
b); 
Community 
outbreak 
(4
a,5
b) 
Post-zone outbreak 
(4
a,5
b); Post-
community outbreak 
(4
a,5
b) 
Hand hygiene (9
a,0
b)  Hospital (9
a,0
b); 
Ambulatory 
(9
a,0
b);  
Community(9
a,0
b); 
Home (9
a,0
b) 
Interpandemic 
(9
a,0
b); Alert 
(9
a,0
b); 
Pandemic 
(9
a,0
b) 
All the time 
(9
a,0
b) 
All the time (9
a,0
b) 
Respiratory etiquette 
(9
a,0
b) 
Hospital (9
a,0
b); 
Ambulatory 
(9
a,0
b);  
Community(9
a,0
b); 
Home (9
a,0
b) 
Interpandemic 
(9
a,0
b); Alert 
(9
a,0
b); 
Pandemic 
(9
a,0
b) 
All the time 
(9
a,0
b) 
All the time (9
a,0
b) 
Surface disinfection 
(beyond usual 
practice) (9
a,0
b) 
Hospital (9
a,0
b); 
Ambulatory 
(9
a,0
b);  
Community(9
a,0
b); 
Home (9
a,0
b) 
Alert (8
a,1
b)  Zone outbreak 
(4
a,5
b); 
Community 
outbreak(4
a,5
b) 
Post-zone outbreak 
(4
a,5
b) 
Ventilation (i.e., open 
windows) (8
a,1
b) 
Home (8
a,0
b)  Alert (7
a,1
b)  Zone outbreak 
(5
a,3
b) 
Post vaccine (3
a,5
b) 
Air disinfection (7
a,2
b)  Hospital (6
a,1
b)  Alert (7
a,0
b)  All the time 
(4
a,3
b) 
All the time (4
a,3
b) 
Visitor restrictions (in 
health facilities) 
(7
a,1
b,1
d) 
Hospital (7
a,0
b) 
 
Alert (6
a,1
b)  Zone outbreak 
(6
a,1
b) 
Post vaccine (5
a,2
b) 
Isolation precautions 
(in health facilities) 
(8
a,1
b) 
Hospital (8
a,0
b) 
 
Alert (8
a,0
b)  Zone outbreak 
(4
a,4
b) 
Post vaccine (5
a,3
b) 
Minimize aerosol-
generating procedures 
(in health facilities) 
(8
a,0
b,1
d) 
Hospital (7
a,1
b) 
 
Alert (7
a,1
b)  Zone outbreak 
(4
a,4
b) 
Post-community 
outbreak (4
a,4
b) 
(continued) 
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Mitigation 
Measure  
Setting   Period  Trigger   Duration  
I
n
f
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
(
c
o
n
t
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Wearing surgical masks 
and N95 respirators – 
provider and patient 
use (9
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Ambulatory 
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Community(9
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Vaccines (9
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Ambulatory (8
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a,0
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Antivirals (9
a,0
b) 
 
 
 
Hospital (8
a,1
b) 
 
Alert (8
a,1
b)  Community 
outbreak 
(8
a,1
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Post-community 
outbreak (6
a,3
b) 
 
a Participant recommended measure  
b Participant did not recommend measure  
c Participant suggested a 
modification to the measure  
d Participant deemed measure not applicable   
e Missing data 
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Table 2.List of Measures Not Recommended to Mitigate an Influenza Pandemic in 
Remote and Isolated First Nations Communities Suggested by Participants (n=9) 
 
Mitigation Measure 
 
Rationale for Not Recommending 
       
Disinfection of clothing, shoes, or 
other objects of persons exiting 
affected areas (4
a,5
b) 
Measure would not be feasible to implement in a remote and isolated 
community due to required monies, supplies, and human resources. 
Sanitary measures at frontiers or on 
conveyances (2
a,7
b) 
Measure would not be feasible, practical, or cost-effective to 
implement.  
Travel restrictions on all departing 
passengers (2
a,7
b) 
Community members would not adhere to the measure and measure 
would be difficult to enforce.  
Self-health monitoring and reporting if 
ill but no restrictions on movement 
(0
a,9
b) 
Self-health monitoring and reporting would be beneficial, but difficult 
for community members to conduct. Measure would also contradict 
the purpose of other mitigation measures directed at limiting virus 
transmission.   
Wearing surgical masks and N95 
respirators – public use (4
a,5
b) 
Limited resource availability, proficiency regarding proper use and 
adherence to the measure would render the measure ineffective for the 
general public.  
Wearing personal protective 
equipment – public use (1
a,8
b) 
Limited resource availability, proficiency regarding proper use and 
adherence to the measure would render the measure ineffective for the 
general public. 
a Participant recommended measure  
b Participant did not recommend measure   
 
Travel Measures 
The majority of travel mitigation measures were recommended for a future influenza pandemic. All of 
the recommended measures were to be implemented in the community, primarily at the airport, during 
the alert period. Most participants agreed that these measures should be implemented when positive 
cases are detected in Canada or at the latest when positive cases are detected in the zone. These 
measures were recommended to be implemented until the outbreak has ceased in the zone or two weeks 
post-vaccination of community members. 
Participants almost unanimously agreed that entry screening of travelers would be a beneficial measure if 
executed properly because the airport is typically the only entry point into their remote and isolated 
communities during the ice-free season. Screening measures could include health questionnaires and 
declarations, temperature screening, thermal scanning, medical examinations, and stop lists (Bell, Nicoll, 
Fukuda, Horby, & Monto, 2006a; Bell, Nicoll, Fukuda, Horby, & Monto, 2006b; Gostin, 2006). 
Although participants felt that exit screening of travelers is an important measure and would help 
contain an outbreak, participants were more mixed about recommending the measure as it was expected 
that the receiving community would conduct screening.  
Participants generally agreed with implementing voluntary travel advisories instead of mandatory travel 
restrictions, although the recommendation would depend on the severity of the community outbreak. 
Participants reported that voluntary measures encourage people to be more self-conscious and 
responsible for their health, while mandatory measures were not perceived to be as practical or feasible. 
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Also, participants reported that voluntary travel advisories would effectively deter the majority of people 
from traveling: 
With voluntary advisories, you would weed out a lot of people…there would probably only be a 
select few that would probably still want to travel anyways and if you could implement the 
precautions and if they would follow them, then I think that would be enough. (Participant #7) 
The majority of participants recommended travel measures that would block the main entry point into 
their communities. Participants reported that closing down all borders and quarantine of a geographic 
area (cordon sanitaire) would help protect their at-risk population if a community outbreak has not yet 
occurred. However, the decision to implement these measures would depend on the severity of the 
pandemic because participants considered these measures to be difficult to implement, enforce, and 
maintain. 
Community Social Distancing Measures  
Participants recommended that all of the proposed community social distancing measures be 
implemented in their communities. Measures that decrease the frequency and duration of social contact, 
such as avoid visiting, avoid crowding, and general social distancing measures (e.g., spacing people, 
staggering work schedules, allowing employees to work from home, etc.) were highly recommended by 
participants during the alert period. Although participants noted the difficulties associated with avoiding 
crowding in overcrowded homes in the communities: 
Overcrowding in the home, it’s hard to try to stay your distance from someone that is sick 
because you’re close to each other walking by and stuff. (Participant #3) 
Participants reported that voluntary sheltering of healthy persons to avoid exposure would be a 
beneficial mitigation measure during the alert period, although it would be the community members’ 
prerogative to implement. Most participants recommended this measure to be implemented in the 
community members’ homes; however, some mentioned that members could camp in the bush as long 
as they had sufficient resources. Participants recommended that these measures should be implemented 
when an outbreak occurs in the zone until the community outbreak has ceased or two weeks post-
vaccination of community members. 
In the community, participants unanimously recommended that schools and childcare centers close 
during the alert period to aid in controlling influenza transmission in the younger age groups, especially 
given the prior experience of infections among First Nations populations.  
It stops the spread of the flu because there are so many children and they are close together and 
it’s a lot more difficult telling a child to close their mouth, wash their hands. (Participant #8) 
It helps a lot to control the spreading…I think the community here took it [A(H1N1)pdm09] 
very seriously…there’s fear because of the history, so the fear is so high here, it’s not like 
anything else down South … they’ve been decimated by infection [in the past]… (Participant 
#1) 
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Conversely, participants’ responses were divided regarding the closure of workplaces during the 
pandemic period. Some participants reported that closing workplaces would be impractical as the 
limited amount of workplaces is essential for the daily functioning of the community; however, others 
were willing to recommend this measure if the severity of the pandemic warranted it. All of these 
measures were recommended to be implemented when a community outbreak occurred and workplaces 
should re-open as soon as the community outbreak ceases, but schools and childcare centers should stay 
closed until two weeks post-vaccination of community members. 
Although all of the participants recommended these measures during the alert period to reduce virus 
transmission, participants were also divided regarding whether recommendations for isolation of 
patients and quarantine of contacts should be mandatory or voluntary. In general, participants 
recommended voluntary isolation when there is an outbreak in the zone, escalating to mandatory 
isolation when a community outbreak occurs. Participants agreed that mandatory or voluntary 
quarantine should only be implemented when there is a community outbreak. Some participants stated 
that community members should isolate until the outbreak has ceased in the community and the zone; 
however, others recommended only isolating until the symptomatic period is over. Participants 
recommended that community members should quarantine for the incubation period post-exposure, 
and then isolate for the symptomatic period if the person falls ill.  
Surveillance Measures 
Participants recommended the implementation of all of the surveillance measures, except for one. 
Participants did not recommend the mitigation measure of self-health monitoring and reporting if ill 
without restrictions on movement. Participants unanimously agreed that monitoring and reporting 
about one’s health would be a beneficial surveillance measure, but not limiting the movement of ill 
individuals would provide opportunities for virus transmission within the community.  
Of the recommended measures, participants reported that monitoring trends of influenza-like illness 
and human surveillance and case reporting during the alert period would produce helpful statistics to 
indicate how effective the response was and how they could better target future response efforts. 
Participants generally suggested that these measures should be implemented on an ongoing basis; 
however, in the context of a pandemic, these measures would be implemented when treating a 
symptomatic person and continue until the outbreak has ceased in the community or post-pandemic. 
The majority of participants also recommended that contact tracing be implemented in the ambulatory 
setting during the pandemic period in order to identify contacts of an index case that may be at risk of 
becoming infected and, in turn, help contain a community outbreak. Participants reported that contact 
tracing should ideally occur until all of the contacts have been reached, but would realistically occur until 
available resources and manpower became overwhelmed. Support for conducting contact tracing was 
qualified by concerns regarding human resources, as a significant number of household and casual 
contacts would have to be contacted due to the overcrowding in homes and extensive social networking.  
Overcrowding is a problem, so even if you call them but you have a family [and] they have 15 
people around them, or 20, if they’ve made contact … and those contact[s] have to be 
contact[ed], so at the end you have to call the whole community for contact tracing … because 
everybody’s related with someone. (Participant #6) 
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If enough resources and manpower were available, participants recommended the implementation of a 
home support program, which involves the provision of infection control supplies and education to 
families in need, during a community outbreak. Moreover, participants considered recommending that 
community members check for fever on a daily basis in their homes during a community outbreak, as 
this measure is a valuable diagnostic tool that would raise awareness about self-health. However, 
participants noted that many families do not own thermometers because they are not available for 
purchase in community stores.  
Infection Control Measures  
Participants recommended most of the proposed infection control measures. Participants 
recommended modifying the cultural practices of kissing and handshaking at church and funeral services 
during the alert period. Hand hygiene and respiratory etiquette were unanimously recommended to be 
implemented all of the time in all of the settings to decrease virus transmission. Participants also 
recommended other general infection control measures during the alert period, including disinfecting 
surfaces (beyond usual practice) and ventilation (i.e., opening windows); although, some drawbacks 
were noted.  
Moneywise…because of the cost of the things we have in here, I don’t think every…[person] 
can buy that [cleaning supplies] to clean the house … [and] most of the houses in here have a 
mold problem… (Participant #6)  
All depends on how well their windows are in the community, but some have broken windows, 
some are boarded up… (Participant #2)  
In the hospital setting, participants recommended that visitor restrictions, isolation precautions, and 
minimizing aerosol-generating procedures be implemented when an outbreak in the zone occurs; these 
measures would be in effect until after the community outbreak ceases or two weeks after community 
members have been vaccinated. Participants unanimously recommended that health care providers and 
patients wear surgical masks to reduce virus transmission during a community outbreak, although it was 
suggested that providers wear N95 respirators if the situation warrants it. Furthermore, participants 
recommended that providers wear personal protective equipment (PPE) during a community outbreak. 
Symptomatic patients were not recommended to wear PPE as the person will ultimately contaminate 
any items that he or she wears, thereby rendering the measure ineffective. Moreover, participants did not 
recommend that the general public wear masks and PPE due to concerns of supply, proficiency 
regarding proper use, and adherence to the measures. 
Lastly, all of the participants reported that pertinent health teachings about influenza and the 
importance of infection control measures should be occurring in Cree and English on an ongoing basis 
to raise awareness. Participants reported that community members received lots of misinformation 
during A(H1N1)pdm09 from various media sources. Thus, participants suggested using multiple 
community-based measures, such as announcements on the local radio station and door-to-door visits 
with Cree translators, to rectify the received misinformation. Also, participants suggested that 
educational materials should be visual, simple, and targeted to their community members in order to be 
most effective.  
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Be more specific and simple, too much information is not better than not enough, and I think we 
have too much information on that case [A(H1N1)pdm09] coming from…too [many sources] 
at the same time, confusing the people, confusing the health care provider, confusing almost 
everyone. (Participant #6) 
Pharmaceutical Measures   
The participants unanimously recommended implementing pandemic-sensitive vaccines and antivirals 
during a community outbreak. The mass vaccination campaigns should commence as soon as the 
vaccines are delivered to the community and ideally continue until herd immunity is achieved. The 
community-based healthcare facility would be responsible for distributing the vaccines to community 
members in a variety of settings, including the hospital, school, and homes of people who are not mobile. 
The antivirals would be dispensed by the hospital to symptomatic people meeting the required criteria.   
Discussion   
Given the unique challenges experienced in remote and isolated Canadian First Nations communities 
during an influenza pandemic that in turn impact their pandemic response capacity and may result in 
more severe health outcomes, the participants recommended that the majority of questioned mitigation 
measures be implemented in their communities. Not surprisingly, similar to national recommendations, 
the participants unanimously recommended the use of vaccines and antivirals, since pharmaceutical 
measures are the best measures to mitigate the impact of a pandemic outbreak (Oshitani, 2006; Public 
Health Agency of Canada, 2006). Although much uncertainty still remains regarding optimal vaccine 
allocation (Tuite, Fisman, Kwong, & Greer, 2010), previous modelling studies have reported that 
rapidly immunizing the population, even with a poorly matched vaccine, could significantly reduce the 
outbreak and number of ill people (Ferguson et al., 2006; Germann, Kadau, Longini Jr., & Macken, 
2006; Wu & Cowling, 2011). Furthermore, the implementation of antiviral drugs for treatment and/or 
prophylaxis purposes during a pandemic could reduce influenza-related attack, hospitalization, and 
death rates (Gani et al., 2005; Longini Jr., Halloran, Nizam, & Yang, 2004; Wu & Cowling, 2011). 
Previous modelling research has suggested that aggressive antiviral therapy significantly reduced the 
impact of A(H1N1)pdm09 in an isolated Canadian First Nations community (Xiao et al., 2013). 
As limitations of supply and cost restrict the use of vaccines and antivirals, especially in remote and 
isolated settings (Finnie, Hall, & Leach, 2012; Low, 2008; Oshitani, 2006), the participants noted the 
importance of recommending a wide variety of non-pharmaceutical mitigation measures to supplement 
the use of pharmaceutical measures. Non-pharmaceutical mitigation measures may aid in delaying, 
reducing, and containing a pandemic outbreak (Bell et al., 2006a; Low, 2008; Markel et al., 2007). 
Pandemic response strategies that appropriately combine pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical 
interventions have been shown to be more effective than individual strategies in terms of delaying the 
outbreak, reducing the number of ill cases, and delaying and reducing the peak attack rate (Lee, Lye, & 
Wilder-Smith, 2009). 
At the national level, of relevance to the presented paper, Annex B of the CPIP discusses planning 
considerations for on-reserve First Nations communities, while Annex M outlines public health 
recommendations including public education, case and contact management, travel and border related 
measures, and community-based interventions (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006). Three 
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community-based interventions are recommended to control a community outbreak, including self-
isolating if symptomatic, closing schools and daycare centres, and restricting “high-risk” indoor public 
gatherings (other than schools) (see Table 3) (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006). All of the 
aforementioned recommendations were also supported by the participants. The participants 
recommended that isolation and quarantine measures begin as voluntary and escalate to mandatory as 
needed. Previous research states that isolation and quarantine are generally effective and acceptable 
measures (Crabtree & Henry, 2011); however, mandatory isolation and quarantine are considered 
ineffective and impractical since viral shedding occurs prior to the onset of symptoms and healthcare 
facilities would rapidly become overwhelmed (Aledort et al., 2007; Bell et al., 2006b). Furthermore, 
although participants recommended the closure of schools and daycare centres, along with cancelling 
and/or restricting public gatherings, due to increased influenza transmission in these settings, there are 
limited data to support the effectiveness of these measures (Roth & Henry, 2011). 
Interestingly, the participants recommended 8 of the 10 community-based interventions that are not 
nationally recommended (see Table 3) (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006). Contrary to national 
recommendations, the majority of participants placed much value in recommending various travel 
measures to protect their communities. Previous research has reported that screening travelers, travel 
restrictions, and closing down airports are generally ineffective and result in substantial economic and 
societal costs (Bell et al., 2006b; Inglesby et al., 2006). However, the CPIP does note that travel 
measures may be more feasible to implement in geographically remote and isolated communities due to 
small population sizes and limited ports of entry (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006). As disease 
transmission is typically amplified due to the characteristics of the study communities (Finnie, et al., 
2012; Groom et al., 2009; Kermode-Scott, 2009; Massey et al., 2009; Massey et al., 2011), travel 
measures directed at preventing the importation of the pandemic virus, especially during a severe 
pandemic, may be particularly important. 
The CPIP notes that recommendations will vary according to local conditions, especially with regards to 
the timing of their implementation (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006). The participants also 
highlighted the importance of specifying the timing of implemented mitigation measures, especially 
since these specifications may vary for geographically remote and isolated communities. Three 
mitigation measures—hand hygiene, respiratory etiquette, and public education—were recommended 
by participants to be implemented all of the time. Similar to the CPIP recommendations, the 
participants recommended that the trigger to implement mitigation measures would be dependent on 
the location of confirmed cases (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006). Participants generally 
recommended that measures should be employed until the outbreak ceases in their community and/or 
the zone, or until herd immunity is achieved two weeks post-vaccination of their community members. 
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Table 3. List of Recommended and Not Recommended Mitigation Measures from 
Annex M of the Canadian Influenza Pandemic Plan for the Health Sector as Evaluated 
by Study Participants 
Recommended Community-Based 
Interventions 
Not Recommended Community-Based 
Interventions 
•  Close schools and daycares* 
o  Trigger: declaration of one or 
more confirmed cases in the 
local community, depending on 
the epidemiological context.  
•  Self-isolate if symptomatic* 
o  Trigger: arrival of one or more 
confirmed cases in the 
province/territory. Reinforce 
recommendation when cases 
occur in the local jurisdiction.  
•  Restrict indoor public gatherings in 
‘high-risk’ settings (other than schools)*  
o  Trigger: when transmission 
occurs within the community.   
•  Thermal scanning in public places* 
•  Restricting travel to and from affected areas* 
•  Cordon sanitaire* 
•  Broadly restricting indoor public gatherings 
(other than schools) * 
•  Urge entire population in an affected area to 
check for fever at least once daily* 
•  Hand-sanitizing stations in public settings* 
•  Surface disinfection beyond usual practice in 
public settings*  
•  Air disinfection*  
•  Disinfection of clothing, shoes, or other 
objects of persons existing affected areas** 
•  Use of masks by the general public (well 
individuals)** 
Note. Source: Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006 
*Participants in the study recommended the measure 
**Participants in the study did not recommend the measure 
 
Interestingly, although typical responses for the implementation trigger were outbreak in the zone or 
community, the participants recommended that most of the mitigation measures be implemented in the 
alert period (before the official declaration of a pandemic). In contrast, during the alert period, the CPIP 
recommends measures to aggressively contain an outbreak and prevent a pandemic, such as isolation 
and quarantine, contact tracing, exit screening, and antiviral therapy; while population-based measures 
are recommended during the pandemic period to reduce and delay the pandemic outbreak (Public 
Health Agency of Canada, 2006). This finding may infer the desire of participants residing in remote 
and isolated First Nations communities to be prepared to rapidly implement mitigation measures to 
prevent the introduction and subsequent spread of a pandemic virus in their communities. 
Since community-level measures will likely be more effective at mitigating a pandemic than 
international- and national-level measures (Bell et al., 2006b), it is vital that remote and isolated First 
Nations communities have appropriate recommendations included in pandemic plans. In light of these 
findings, pandemic planners, especially those that are dedicated to community-based pandemic 
planning, should consider the following policy implications. Given the different challenges and health 
outcomes experienced in remote and isolated First Nations communities, it may be appropriate that 
future pandemic plans recommend pandemic control strategies in such communities that may not be 
supported in other Canadian communities. These findings highlight the importance of developing 
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mitigation measures that address the population’s values, beliefs, perceptions, and cultural differences in 
order to be appropriate and effective (Massey et al., 2011). For instance, culture influenced some of the 
recommended mitigation measures since participants were open to modifying the cultural practices of 
kissing and handshaking at church and funeral services, and traditional medicine was suggested as an 
additional beneficial mitigation measure. 
It is also important that future policies address community differences. Participants raised concerns that 
overcrowded impoverished housing and limited supplies impacted the ability of community members to 
comply with the recommended mitigation measures. Participants also noted that the implementation of 
some mitigation measures might overwhelm their limited health care infrastructure. As these 
communities have a high proportion of people with pre-existing co-morbidities who are at risk of more 
severe influenza-related outcomes, the capacity of their health care infrastructure may be further strained 
by patients visiting with influenza symptoms and by the effects of non-pharmaceutical mitigation 
measures. To help overcome these barriers, policies and action aimed at improving living conditions, 
providing money for stockpiling supplies, and improving health care infrastructure in these communities 
is imperative prior to the next influenza pandemic.  
Furthermore, the implementation of certain measures, such as the distribution of scarce resources (e.g., 
antivirals), may raise many legal, political, and ethical issues, especially when there is limited scientific 
evidence to support the measure (Aledort et al., 2007; Thompson et al., 2006). For instance, although 
mandatory isolation and quarantine may infringe upon the ethical value of individual liberty and are not 
commonly recommended (Thompson et al., 2006), the majority of participants reported that they 
would recommend these measures to help minimize virus transmission if a community outbreak 
occurred. Engaging and partnering with community members using participatory approaches are vital to 
create pandemic plans that are community- and culturally- appropriate (Massey et al., 2011).  
The optimal community-level approach to mitigate the effects of an influenza pandemic in remote 
and/or isolated Indigenous communities is still unknown. There remains a paucity of scientific evidence 
regarding the assumptions that currently guide pandemic planning and the effectiveness of mitigation 
measures; thus, most planners resort to historical accounts, mathematical modelling studies, and expert 
opinion (Aledort et al., 2007; Bell et al., 2006b; Markel et al., 2007). To aid planners in making more 
informed recommendations, future research regarding influenza transmission characteristics should be 
encouraged in remote and/or isolated Indigenous communities because vast heterogeneities exist. 
Future studies should also explore what mitigation measures are most cost-effective and what 
combination of mitigation measures would be most effective in these communities 
Conclusion 
Influenza pandemics continue to disproportionately impact Indigenous populations worldwide, 
especially those residing in geographically remote and/or isolated areas. The differential risk 
experienced by such communities warrants the need for recommendations for mitigation measures that 
are context-specific and community-informed. The present study elicited a list of recommended 
pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical measures to mitigate the effects of an influenza pandemic in 
three remote and isolated Canadian First Nations communities. The results indicated that participants 
recommended a wide variety of mitigation measures that often differed from national recommendations 
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and existing literature. Participants also revealed that a number of barriers impacted their ability to 
feasibly implement recommended measures.  
These findings suggest that it may be appropriate to recommend pandemic control strategies in remote 
and isolated Canadian First Nations communities that may not be supported in other communities. 
These findings also highlight the importance of engaging locally impacted populations using 
participatory approaches in policy decision-making processes. Other countries with remote and/or 
isolated Indigenous communities are encouraged to include recommendations for mitigation measures 
that specifically address the unique needs of such communities in an effort to improve their health 
outcomes during the next influenza pandemic. Future research should be directed towards better 
understanding the current assumptions that guide pandemic planning and the effectiveness of mitigation 
measures in remote and/or isolated Indigenous communities, as vast heterogeneities exist.  
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